Sovereign Credit Rating Announcements and Baltic Stock Markets by Klimavičienė, Asta
 51
ISSN 2029-4581. ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES,  2011, VOL. 2, No. 1(3)
Sovereign Credit Rating  
AnnounCementS And BAltiC StoCk 
mArketS
Asta klimavičienė*
ISM University of Management and Economics, Lithuania
Abstract. This study examines whether sovereign credit rating announcements convey price relevant 
information to investors in Baltic stock markets, and tests the degree of anticipation and price reaction. 
Event study methodology is employed to test for the price impact of sovereign credit rating announ-
cements by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. This enables to analyse whether there is an anticipation of the 
forthcoming announcement in a particular market, a price impact on the announcement day, and a 
possible delayed reaction. Results indicate that there is an asymmetric reaction: the price impact of 
negative events is several times larger than that of positive events. Moreover, although some types of 
rating announcements are anticipated, there is still a significant price impact on the announcement 
day. The impact differs across the three Baltic stock markets, and depends on the credit rating agency 
issuing the announcement. The main conclusion is that sovereign credit rating announcements contain 
pricing relevant news in addition to information already in a public domain.
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1. introduction 
Sovereign credit ratings are widely used measures of the creditworthiness of a particular 
country’s government. Changes in credit ratings, whether real or potential, indicate 
not only that the credit risk of the government increases or decreases, but also that 
the macroeconomic environment changes, and thus it may have an impact on the 
performance of the companies which operate in that country. One possible approach to 
examine the effect of the sovereign credit rating announcements is to investigate their 
impact on stock prices.
Over the last decade, 2000 to 2009, the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania) experienced a period of rapid economic growth (earning them a 
nickname “Baltic Tigers”) and then a subsequent contraction under conditions of the 
global financial crisis. The former period was marked by a succession of credit rating 
upgrades, while in the latter period credit rating agencies were issuing frequent negative 
announcements, including both negative reviews and rating downgrades.
* E-mail: asta.klimaviciene@ism.lt 
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The focus of this paper is to examine the price impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements on the stock markets of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I examine 
both real rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) as well as other types of rating 
announcements, which indicate a possible rating change in a short to medium term. 
The latter group includes positive and negative outlooks or watches. Announcements 
from all three major credit rating agencies are included, namely, Moody’s Investor 
Services (henceforth Moody’s), Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch Ratings (Fitch). 
The method to test for the significance of ratings announcements to the stock markets 
follows a conventional event study framework.
The majority of event studies examining the price impact of credit rating 
announcements focus on corporate stock and bond markets, and use corporate credit 
ratings. Norden & Weber (2004) provide a summary of such literature, their data 
samples and main results. 
Research on sovereign credit ratings can be divided into two categories: studies 
which analyse the determinants of sovereign credit ratings (e.g., Cantor & Packer, 
1996; Afonso, 2003; Mora, 2005), and studies examining the price impact of rating 
announcements. The latter group usually focuses on the sovereign bond market (Larrain 
et al., 1997; Reisen & von Maltzan, 1999; Gaillard, 2007).
This paper contributes to studies which focus on the relationship between sovereign 
credit rating announcements and stock markets in emerging countries. Previous 
literature in this area includes Kaminsky & Schmukler (2002), Brooks et al. (2004), 
and Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007).
Kaminsky & Schmukler (2002) focus on cross-country and cross-security contagion. 
They analyse both local and foreign currency rating changes and reviews by Moody’s, 
S&P and Fitch for 16 emerging market countries that either underwent a crisis or 
suffered spillover effects during January 1990 – June 2000. Kaminsky & Schmukler 
(2002) estimate panel regressions using daily variables, therefore do not include any 
country “fundamentals” (macrovariables). They find that rating changes significantly 
affect both bond and stock markets, the former to a greater extent. Moreover, rating 
reviews also seem to have pricing relevant information. Their findings suggest that 
contagion effects are stronger during crises, especially at a regional level and for non-
transparent economies.
Brooks et al. (2004) analyse the price impact of the sovereign credit rating changes 
on the national stock markets. Their sample includes rating changes (i.e. only upgrades 
and downgrades, not rating reviews) from four rating agencies: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch 
IBCA and Thomson (now part of Fitch) and spans 1973–2001. They undertake an event 
study using three approaches to abnormal returns: a market model, a mean-adjusted 
method, and simply using raw returns. The estimation period spans [-120; 21] days 
around a rating event, while the testing period is [-10; 10] days. As a robustness test, 
they regress event day’s abnormal return on a number of variables, including agency 
dummies, an indication of whether the country is developed or emerging market, 
and control for multiple events and split ratings. Consistent with previous studies on 
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corporate markets, Brooks et al. (2004) find that only downgrades seem to have a price 
impact.
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) analyse the price impact of sovereign ratings 
announcements by Moody’s and S&P on stock and bond markets. The sample includes 
rating changes and reviews for 34 countries during 1990-2000. They utilize a market 
model with a world stock index and U.S. Treasury bond returns as benchmarks for stock 
and bond markets, respectively. Event window spans [-45;45] days, the significance of 
CAARs (cumulative average abnormal returns) is tested over different length intervals 
surrounding rating announcement days. Findings suggest an asymmetrical response: 
equity and bond prices react to downgrades but not upgrades. Furthermore, sovereign 
bond yields anticipate rating downgrades. Rating reviews, both positive and negative, do 
not seem to have an impact on a country’s stock market, but exhibit both an anticipation 
and a price reaction in sovereign bond markets. 
Based on the previous literature, the first hypothesis of this study is that there is 
an asymmetrical effect: stock markets exhibit a stronger reaction to negative events 
(downgrades and negative reviews) than to positive events (upgrades and positive 
outlooks). The second hypothesis, based on a regional effect, is that the price reaction 
is qualitatively similar across all three Baltic markets. The third hypothesis is that the 
results are qualitatively similar across all three credit rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, 
and Fitch).
The contribution of the paper is testing the price impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements on the stock market indices in three Baltic countries. The focus is on 
the indices in a window of [-20; 10] business days around the announcement, which 
enables to analyse whether the stock markets anticipate a rating event, to test the price 
impact on the announcement day and for a potential delayed reaction up to two weeks 
afterwards.
Results indicate that there is an asymmetric effect: the price impact of downgrades 
is much higher than that of upgrades. Moreover, while some types of sovereign rating 
announcements are anticipated and reflected in stock market indices, the largest price 
impact occurs on the announcement day. Finally, the price impact differs by country 
and also depends on which credit rating agency issues an announcement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
explanation of sovereign credit ratings. Section 3 presents an event study framework 
employed in an empirical analysis. The data used in the paper is described in section 4, 
while section 5 provides an analysis of the results of the price impact of sovereign credit 
rating announcements. Concluding comments are given in section 6.
2. Credit ratings
Sovereign credit ratings are important indicators of a government’s default probability 
and are widely used as measures of the credit risk of both a security and its issuer. The 
three main international credit rating agencies are Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), 
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and Fitch. These agencies use similar rating scales and methodologies, and their ratings 
are largely comparable. Rating agencies operate in an effective oligopoly: Moody’s and 
S&P hold approximately 80% of the market share, with Fitch controlling another 15% 
(Blaurock, 2007). While rating agencies state that their ratings are simply intended to 
provide an independent opinion on credit quality, they are in effect very influential and 
widely used by participants in financial markets. Gonzalez et al. (2004, p.8) note that 
markets tend to view credit ratings “as benchmarks or creditworthiness standards”.
Rating agencies provide both long- and short-term ratings. Separate credit ratings 
are assigned for obligations denominated in local and foreign currency. In addition to 
ratings, agencies also provide indicators of possible rating changes. There are two types 
of such indicators: rating outlooks and rating watches. Outlooks provide information 
of a possible rating change in a medium term. Rating watches are short-term indicators, 
and are usually event-driven. Both outlooks and watches can be positive (indicating 
a potential upgrade of a credit rating), negative (worsening conditions indicating a 
possible downgrade), stable (indicating that a change in a rating in either direction is 
unlikely in a short or medium term), and “evolving” or “developing” (assigned when a 
direction of a rating change is uncertain).
While credit ratings indicate future default probability, they are not absolute 
measures of credit risk. Instead, they provide an ordinal ranking, i.e. information on 
relative creditworthiness. All major rating agencies employ similar rating scales, which 
consist of 20 or more notches (see Table 1 below).
TABLE 1. rating scales used by moody’s, S&P, and Fitch
moody’s S&P Fitch description
Aaa AAA AAA Highest credit quality, minimum credit risk
Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 AA+, AA, AA- AA+, AA, AA- Very high credit quality, very low credit risk
A1, A2, A3 A+, A, A- A+, A, A- High credit quality (upper-medium grade)
Baa1, Baa2, 
Baa3
BBB+, BBB, 
BBB-
BBB+, BBB, 
BBB-
Good credit quality, currently low credit risk
Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB+, BB, BB- BB+, BB, BB- Speculative elements, issuer faces major 
uncertainties and adverse conditions 
B1, B2, B3 B+, B, B- B+, B, B- High credit risk, but issuer still able to meet 
its financial commitments
Caa1, Caa2, 
Caa3
CCC+, CCC, 
CCC-
CCC Issuer currently vulnerable, default likely
Ca CC CC Issuer currently highly vulnerable, near 
default
C R, SD, D C, RD, D Lowest rating, typically in default on some 
(SD, RD) or all of its financial obligations
Such ordinal ranking allows comparisons among rating categories. For example, it is 
expected that defaults within category B will occur with a lower frequency than defaults 
within CCC+.
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Ratings AAA (Aaa) through BBB- (Baa3)1 belong to the so-called investment-grade 
category, while those below BBB- are called speculative or non-investment grade ratings. 
Rating agencies utilize modifiers to distinguish among relative creditworthiness within 
rating classes: Fitch and S&P use + and -, while Moody’s employ numerical modifiers 
1, 2, and 3.
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch each rate more than 100 countries. Sovereign credit ratings 
comprise issuer default ratings, government bond ratings, and “country ceilings”. A 
“country ceiling” is a credit rating reflecting the government’s ability to interfere on the 
repayment ability of other institutions under its jurisdiction.
Data used in this paper comprises sovereign long-term issuer ratings in foreign 
currency. Sovereign credit ratings differ considerably from those assigned to corporates 
in relation to the notion of credit risk (Gonzalez et al., 2004). Unlike for corporate 
issuers, the likelihood of default for sovereigns depends not only on their financial 
ability, but also on the “willingness to pay”. In practice financial capacity and willingness 
to pay are usually connected. However, since governments’ creditors have a limited 
legal enforcement power, a sovereign may selectively default on some of its obligations, 
while continuing to honour payments on its remaining debt obligations.
All agencies report that their models for determining credit ratings include variables 
reflecting a country’s macroeconomic performance, public finance, external debt, 
monetary policy, and political risk.
3. event Study Framework
An event study methodology is a common framework used to test the effect of the 
occurrence of a particular event on prices in financial markets.2
The first step in an event study is to precisely define an event and to select an 
appropriate testing window, i.e. an interval around the event (including the event date) 
during which price movements will be examined. The event day is denoted as day 0, and 
other days are aligned accordingly in “event time”. The events being studied in this paper 
are sovereign credit rating announcements by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, which include 
both rating changes and reviews (outlooks or watches). Since credit ratings tend to be 
“sticky”, i.e. credit rating agencies have a policy of not changing them frequently, it is 
possible to expect that the stock markets will be anticipating rating announcements, 
particularly changes to sovereign credit ratings. Despite the anticipation, there may still 
be a significant reaction on the announcement day. However, if stock markets are semi-
strong form efficient in a sense that new information is instantaneously incorporated in 
stock prices, there should not be any significant abnormal returns after the event.
1 ���������� � ���� ��� ������� ��������� �� ����� ��� ��� ����� ���� ��������� �� ������� �� ��� �����
����.
2 ��� M��K����� (1997) ��� � �������� ��v��� �� ��� m��� m������ ���� �� �v��� �������. �� ����� 
that the first such study was published in 1933. Major improvements in methodology took place in 
��� 1960� ��� 1980�.
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All rating announcements are aligned in event-time, and the testing window used is 
of [-20; 10] business days, sub-dividing it into four intervals: [-20; -11], [-10; -1] event 
day 0, and [1; 10]. This enables us to test the impact of rating announcements including 
an anticipation up to a month in advance, and a delayed reaction up two weeks after the 
event.
In order to examine the effect of an event, a measure of abnormal return must be 
chosen. In order to calculate it, one needs to select a proxy for a “normal return”, which 
is customarily some benchmark return, such as a market index. Abnormal returns can 
then be calculated using a number of different approaches. The market-model-adjusted 
method (or “market model”) is the most common approach. A body of literature has 
found that the market model is usually the most powerful, and in that sense the most 
reliable.3 It models the security’s returns as a linear function of the market return:
Equation 1. Market-model-adjusted returns
E[Rit] = αi + βi × Rmt
where E[Rit] is the expected return of the Baltic stock markets at time t, and Rmt is the 
return on MSCI EM Small Country index at time t.
This method requires an estimation period over which a regression is estimated, 
and such period ideally should not include the testing window. The estimation period 
chosen in this paper consists of 100 days before the testing window, i.e. [-140; -21]. 
Regression results give estimates of coefficients αi and βi. These are then used to 
compute expected returns over the testing period. The abnormal stock returns are then 
calculated as follows:
Equation 2. Abnormal stock market returns
ARi,t = Ri,t – E[Rit]
where ARi,t – abnormal stock market return for country i on day t;
 Ri,t – stock market return for country i on day t;
 E[Rit] – expected return on stock market return for country i on day t.
The null hypothesis is that there are no abnormal stock market returns, i.e. that ARi,t 
equals zero. 
Given the small size of the sample in this study (see section IV for details), standard 
cross-sectional t-tests may not be appropriate. Moreover, the size of the sub-samples 
by country and by rating agency is in most cases too small to employ the bootstrap 
approach. Therefore, the statistical significance of abnormal returns is estimated for 
each event individually, by calculating t-statistics treating each event as a clinical study.
If abnormal returns are statistically significant, I expect a positive sign for positive 
events, and a negative sign for negative ones.
3 ��� ��� ��v��� ��� ��m������� �� ��������� m����� �m������ �� �v��� ������� ��� A�m����� (1995) 
��� M��K����� (1997).
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4. data 
Data used in this paper is daily in frequency and spans the period from January 2000 
to June 2009. It consists of Baltic stock market indices, MSCI EM SmallCap index as a 
proxy for benchmark returns, and sovereign credit rating announcements.
This study employs the OMX Baltic All-Share index data for three Baltic countries: 
OMX Tallinn, OMX Riga, and OMX Vilnius. These indices are value-weighted and 
include the shares listed on both main and secondary lists of the Baltic stock exchanges. 
As of September 2009, the capitalization for all three Baltic stock markets was 6.5 billion 
EUR. Tallin, Riga, and Vilnius stock markets had the capitalization of 1.8, 1.2, and 3.5 
billion EUR, respectively. 
As a proxy for emerging market stock returns, MSCI Emerging Markets SmallCap 
index is used. This index covers more than 20 emerging markets and includes securities 
of companies with market capitalization between $200 million and $1.5 billion.
Sovereign credit rating announcement data is collected from all three major credit 
rating agencies: Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. It consists of both rating changes, i.e. upgrades 
or downgrades, and changes in the outlook. The latter include outlooks and watches, as 
well as rating revisions up or down to a stable outlook. I collectively refer to this group 
of rating announcements as either positive or negative reviews. During the sample 
period ( January 2000 – June 2009), the three agencies made 57 rating announcements 
concerning sovereign credit ratings of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Fitch, Moody’s, 
and S&P each made 33, 13, and 11 announcements, respectively. 
The breakdown of the sample by country and by event type is provided in the table 
below:
TABLE 2. Sovereign credit rating announcements 
 upgrades
Positive 
reviews downgrades
negative 
reviews total
Estonia 5 6 2 5 18
Latvia 3 2 7 5 17
Lithuania 10 5 4 3 22
 18 13 13 13 57
The distribution of events by country is quite even: there are 18 announcements 
concerning sovereign credit rating of Estonia, 17 for Latvia, and 22 for Lithuania. 
During the sample period there were slightly more positive rating announcements (31) 
than negative ones (26).
5. empirical Analysis
The price impact of sovereign rating announcements and the extent to which Baltic 
stock markets are anticipating them can first be evaluated by examining cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs). Figure 1 shows average CARs for negative events. 
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It seems that Baltic stock markets are not anticipating downgrades well in 
advance, since CARs are actually increasing during the [-20; -10] window before the 
announcement. However, CARs start to decline two weeks before the downgrade. There 
is also a drop on the event day, and a sharp decline two days after the announcement. 
The pattern for negative reviews is slightly different: declining CARs indicate that 
Baltic stock markets seem to be anticipating them as much as three weeks in advance, 
but there is no reaction on the event day, and no trend for CARs after the negative 
announcement.
Figure 2 shows the pattern of CARs for each country, focusing on downgrades. 
CARs for Latvia do not seem to have a trend, indicating that downgrades of Latvia’s 
government by credit rating agencies do not seem to have a price impact on Latvia’s stock 
FIGURE 1. Cumulative abnormal returns for negative events
FIGURE 2. Cumulative abnormal returns for downgrades, breakdown by country
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market. The picture for Estonia and Lithuania, however, is quite different: declining 
CARs indicate that both markets are anticipating a negative event two to three weeks in 
advance, but the largest price impact occurs on the announcement of a downgrade and 
on the days immediately following it.
I now turn to a more rigorous analysis by examining coefficients of daily mean 
abnormal returns (ARs) in different testing intervals. Results on the stock markets’ price 
reaction to the sovereign credit rating announcements are given in the table below.
TABLE 3. Abnormal returns by event type
 mean daily Ars[-20; -11] [-10; -1] day 0 [1; 10]
Upgrades -0.017% -0.056% 0.065% -0.030%
 
Positive reviews -0.119% -0.137% 0.249% 0.087%
 
Downgrades 0.152% -0.252% -0.666% -0.106%
 
Negative reviews -0.176% -0.306% 0.787% -0.138%
Note: Testing intervals represent business days w.r.t. an announcement day. Mean daily abnormal 
returns (ARs) are calculated as an arithmetic average of individual events’ ARs which are signifi-
cant at the 5% level.
Results are compatible with the asymmetry hypothesis: the price impact of negative 
announcements is larger than that of positive ones. Abnormal returns associated with 
upgrades (0.065%) are ten times smaller in absolute value than those associated with 
downgrades (-0.666%).  
Positive events are not anticipated, since mean daily ARs are actually negative during 
the month preceding the announcement. Baltic stock markets seem to be anticipating 
downgrades, as evidenced by daily ARs of -0.252% during the [-10; -1] window. In 
addition, there is a delayed reaction one week following the announcement. Negative 
reviews do not have the expected negative price impact on the announcement day 0, as 
ARs are actually positive at 0.787%. However, they are anticipated during the month 
preceding the announcement: daily ARs are -0.2% during the [-20; -11] window, and 
-0.3% in two weeks before the event. Moreover, there seems to be a delayed reaction 
during the two weeks following the announcement, with daily ARs of -0.14%.
The second hypothesis is that the price impact is qualitatively similar across all three 
Baltic countries. In order to test it, the analysis is conducted for each country separately. 
Results are presented in Table 4.
Results indicate that the price impact differs by country. Upgrades seem to have the 
strongest effect on Latvia’s stock market: abnormal returns are 0.41% on the announ-
ce ment day. Stock markets in Estonia and Latvia react to positive reviews, with ARs of 
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0.3%, and 0.4%, respectively. However, positive sovereign credit rating events do not 
seem to have a strong price impact on Lithuania’s stock market.
Downgrades have the strongest impact on Estonia’s stock market, with ARs of –2.6% 
on the announcement day. Respective coefficient for Lithuania is puzzlingly positive, as 
are ARs of negative reviews for Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania’s stock market seems to 
have a strong reaction to negative reviews, with ARs of –1.0%.
The anticipation of rating reviews is qualitatively similar across all three Baltic 
countries. The anticipation of rating changes, however, is different. Upgrades do not 
seem to be anticipated in Estonia and Lithuania, since mean daily ARs before the 
announcement are actually negative. Upgrades for Latvia, however, are anticipated up 
to two weeks in advance, with daily ARs of 0.2%.  Downgrades are anticipated in all 
countries. In Estonia this effect is the strongest during the [-20; -11] window, while in 
Latvia it happens two weeks before the event. Downgrades of Lithuania are anticipated 
up to a month in advance, and the effect is the strongest during the two weeks preceding 
the announcement, with daily ARs of -0.454%.
The third hypothesis of the study is that the price impact is qualitatively similar 
across all three rating agencies. It is tested by conducting a separate analysis for each 
rating agency. Due to small sample sizes, the analysis focuses on positive versus negative 
events, without further dividing them into rating changes and reviews. Results are given 
in Table 5.
The strongest reaction to positive events is associated with announcements made 
by Moody’s: ARs of 0.5% on the event day. Similar statistics for Fitch is 0.2%, while 
that for S&P is puzzlingly negative. Examining ARs associated with negative events, it 
TABLE 4. Abnormal returns by event type and country
 mean daily Ars
[-20; -11] [-10; -1] day 0 [1; 10]
Upgrades
 
Estonia -0.042% -0.120% -0.103% -0.009%
Latvia 0.006% 0.197% 0.410% 0.056%
Lithuania -0.009% -0.075% 0.080% -0.057%
Positive reviews
 
Estonia -0.235% -0.165% 0.312% -0.314%
Latvia -0.023% -0.178% 0.378% 1.008%
Lithuania -0.037% -0.078% 0.095% 0.015%
Downgrades
 
Estonia -0.296% -0.067% -2.575% -0.460%
Latvia 0.522% -0.190% -0.603% 0.082%
Lithuania -0.273% -0.454% 0.178% -0.258%
Negative reviews Estonia -0.109% -0.263% 0.225% 0.361%
Latvia -0.451% -0.380% 1.527% -0.287%
Lithuania 0.790% -0.098% -1.045% -0.537%
Note:  Testing intervals represent business days w.r.t. an announcement day. Mean daily abnormal 
returns (ARs) are calculated as an arithmetic average of individual events’ ARs which are signifi-
cant at the 5% level.
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seems that Baltic stock markets exhibit the strongest reaction to such announcements 
by Moody’s: ARs of –0.4% on the event day.
Positive rating announcements by S&P and Fitch do not seem to be anticipated, 
while those of Moody’s only slightly so. However, there is a delayed reaction to positive 
events by Moody’s, since mean daily ARs during the [1; 10] are 0.2%. Anticipation 
of negative events is qualitatively different across the rating agencies. Negative 
announcements by Moody’s are only slightly anticipated in two weeks preceding the 
event; those by S&P do not seem to be anticipated. Negative announcements by Fitch, 
however, are anticipated during the [-20; -11] and [-10; -1] windows with daily ARs of 
-0.236% and -0.431%, respectively. In addition, there is a delayed reaction to negative 
rating announcements by S&P and Fitch: daily ARs in two weeks following the event 
are -0.7% and -0.2%, respectively.
6. Concluding Comments
This paper examines the price impact of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch sovereign credit 
rating announcements, including both rating changes and reviews, on the stock market 
indices of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, utilizing standard event study methodology.
Empirical analysis indicates that there is an asymmetric reaction: the price impact 
of negative events tends to be larger than that of positive events. Results do not seem 
to support the hypothesis that the reaction is qualitatively similar across all three Baltic 
markets. The announcement of upgrades has the largest impact on Latvia’s stock market, 
while downgrades affect Estonia’s stock market most. The price impact of negative 
reviews is the strongest in Lithuania’s stock market. 
The hypothesis that the price impact is qualitatively similar across all three credit 
rating agencies is not supported by empirical evidence: Baltic stock markets exhibit the 
strongest price reaction to sovereign credit rating announcements by Moody’s.
The main conclusion is that although some types of rating announcements are 
anticipated by the Baltic stock markets, there is still a significant price impact on the 
TABLE 5. Abnormal returns by event type and rating agency
 
 
mean daily Ars
[-20; -11] [-10; -1] day 0 [1; 10]
Positive events
 
Moody’s 0.089% 0.091% 0.469% 0.181%
S&P -0.293% -0.146% -0.389% -0.035%
Fitch -0.031% -0.147% 0.237% -0.019%
Negative events
 
Moody’s 0.604% -0.021% -0.391% 0.102%
S&P 0.191% 0.300% -0.149% -0.688%
Fitch -0.236% -0.431% -0.050% -0.174%
Note:  Testing intervals represent business days w.r.t. an announcement day. Mean daily abnormal 
returns (ARs) are calculated as an arithmetic average of individual events’ ARs which are signifi-
cant at the 5% level.
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announcement day. It indicates that sovereign credit rating announcements contain 
pricing relevant news in addition to information already in a public domain.
Future research on this topic could analyse the main determinants of abnormal 
returns by conducting a regression analysis, controlling for rating changes that were 
preceded by rating reviews, or by similar events by another agency. In addition, it would 
be interesting to examine potential contagion effects: whether sovereign credit rating 
announcements for one country have a price impact on other Baltic stock markets. 
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